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No More Blood
Kerry Abrams
Problems have plagued the ius sanguinis principle – the transmission of citi-
zenship from parent to child – for as long as it has existed. Costica Dumbrava 
is surely correct that the time has come to ask whether ius sanguinis is still 
necessary. But the core problem with ius sanguinis, I would argue, is not that 
it uses the parent-child relationship to determine membership but that it 
overemphasizes the importance of the genetic tie to this relationship.
The very term ius sanguinis – ‘right of blood’ – makes the genetic tie the 
sine qua non of belonging. It is this obsession with genetic purity that has 
linked ius sanguinis to tribalism, xenophobia, and even genocide. This prob-
lem, I believe, is distinct from the very real need to ensure children’s access 
to the same geographic territory and legal system as that of their parents. 
Rainer Bauböck’s proposal for a ‘ius filiationis’ based on family association 
rather than genetic ties would excise many of the problems caused by a 
focus on blood while protecting the parent-child relationship and the stabil-
ity for children that flows from it.
Let me explain in more detail why I think that retaining recognition of 
parent-child relationships while abandoning the other features of ius sangui-
nis is sensible. At first glance, protecting the tying of children’s citizenship 
to that of their parents may appear problematic because of that relationship’s 
historical ties to property ownership. But a closer look shows that children 
really do deserve different legal treatment than adults, and ius filiationis is 
one critical way the law can recognise that difference.
Ius sanguinis feels retrograde today because it developed during a time 
in which relationships between parents and children, as well as relationships 
between husbands and wives and masters and servants, were much more 
akin to property-chattel relationships than we understand them to be today. 
Today’s family law was yesterday’s law of the household, which set forth 
entitlements and obligations based on reciprocal legal statuses – parent and 
child, husband and wife, master and servant, master and apprentice (and 
sometimes master and slave). Each of these relationships was hierarchical, 
involving responsibilities on the part of the superior party in the hierarchy 
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(father, husband, or master) and obligations of service on the part of the 
inferior party (child, wife, servant, apprentice, or slave).1 The inferior party 
derived identity from the superior: a wife or a child’s nominal citizenship 
often followed that of the husband or father, but this identity did not confer 
the same rights enjoyed by the superior party. In early America, for example, 
male citizens were often entitled to the right to vote, right to contract, and 
right to own property (in fact, ownership of property was often a prerequi-
site for voting) but their wives – also technically citizens – were not entitled 
to any of these rights. Their political participation took the form of provid-
ing moral guidance to their husbands and raising virtuous sons who could 
themselves exercise political power. 2
Today, we no longer think of citizenship in this way. The rights con-
ferred by citizenship are understood in Western democracies as universal. 
If, for example, I become a naturalised U.S. citizen, the same neutral voting 
laws apply to me that apply to any other citizen, regardless of my gender, 
marital status, race, or national origin. Likewise, laws that imposed deriva-
tive citizenship on wives, and even laws that expatriated women upon mar-
riage – both of which used to be widespread – are no longer the norm. In 
many parts of the world, women are no longer understood as intellectually 
and financially dependent on their husbands but instead as autonomous 
adults, capable of making their own economic, moral, and legal decisions, 
including the decision to consent to citizenship or renounce it. And even 
more dramatically, we no longer think of servants as deriving legal identity 
from their masters; instead, workers are free to participate in free, if regu-
lated, labour markets and their citizenship status is independent of their 
employee status. 3
The one legal distinction, however, that all countries still maintain in 
determining the capacity to exercise the rights associated with citizenship is 
age. Children are generally considered to be incapable of giving legal 
1 Halley, J. (2011), ‘What is Family Law?: A Genealogy, Part I’, Yale Journal of 
Law & Humanities 23 (1): 1–109, at 2.
2 Kerber, L. (1980), Women of the Republic: Intellect & Ideology in 
Revolutionary America. Chapel Hill: UNC Press.
3 In contrast to the independent citizenship status of workers, employer-spon-
sored immigration provisions may represent the vestiges of the ancient 
master-servant status relationship. See Raghunath, R. (2014), ‘A Founding 
Failure of Enforcement: Freedmen, Day Laborers, and the Perils of an 
Ineffectual State,’ C.U.N.Y. L. Rev. 18 (1): 47–91.
K. Abrams
123
 consent and in need of legal protection. The particular age at which they 
become capable of reasoning is contested, but it is incontestable that a new-
born cannot care for himself nor meaningfully choose a nationality. In many 
circumstances, the law provides the protection children need by requiring 
children’s parents to provide for them, care of them, and make decisions for 
them; in some instances, the state takes on this responsibility (foster care 
and universal public education are both examples). Children occupy a very 
different legal space than women or workers, one that makes them vulnera-
ble when their ties to their parents are weakened. Providing children with a 
citizenship that they can exercise simultaneously with that of at least one of 
their parents is a critical protection for their wellbeing. We can believe this 
to be so while simultaneously rejecting the traditional hierarchies of parent- 
child, husband-wife, and master-slave. The United Kingdom’s move away 
from conceptualizing parent-child relationships as ‘custodial’, property-like 
relationships and instead describing them as involving ‘parental responsibil-
ity’ is a good example of this shift. The emphasis has changed from owner-
ship and control to care and protection.
If, then, we still need a form of parent-to-child citizenship transmission, 
is ius sanguinis as traditionally understood what we need? Scholars, courts, 
and government agencies often take ius sanguinis literally, as the ‘rule of 
blood’. But I think that rigidity is misplaced. Even centuries ago the notion 
of ius sanguinis meant something distinct from a pure genetic tie. For men, 
who could never be certain of their child’s paternity, transmission ‘through 
blood’ often really meant transmission through choice. A man chose to 
acknowledge his children by marrying, or already being married to, their 
mother. Children born to unmarried mothers generally took on the citizen-
ship of their mothers, not their fathers, regardless of whether the father was 
known. The notion of ‘blood’, then, was complicated by the requirement of 
marriage for citizenship transmission through the father and the man’s 
unique ability to embrace or repudiate his offspring based on his marital 
relationship to their mother. Presumably, many children, prior to blood and 
DNA testing, acquired citizenship iure sanguinis when there was actually no 
blood tie, sometimes in circumstances where the father was ignorant of this 
fact and sometimes where he knew full well no blood relationship existed.4 
Ius sanguinis has always been about more and less than simply blood.
4 Abrams, K. & K. Piacenti (2014), ‘Immigration’s Family Values’, Va. L. Rev. 
100 (4): 629–709, at 660, 663, 692.
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Thus, Bauböck’s notion of ius filiationis seems to me both the most 
appropriate form today for citizenship transmission from parent to child to 
take, and a more accurate description of what really occurred historically. As 
I see it, the most challenging obstacle to implementing a ius filiationis sys-
tem is that birthright citizenship is fixed in time. Courts are not in a position 
to predict on the date of a child’s birth the adult who will ultimately assume 
parental responsibility for a child, but they can determine who the genetic or 
marital parent is. Shifting to a ius filiationis system, then, requires a multi-
faceted response. First, statutes outlining the requirements for citizenship 
transmission at birth should be amended to identify the intended parents. In 
most circumstances, the intended parents will be the genetic parents, but in 
some instances they might be someone else – for example, a non-genetic 
parent who contracts with a gestational surrogate or the spouse or partner of 
a genetic parent. Various pieces of evidence, from birth certificates to con-
tracts to court judgments, would be necessary to determine parentage. In 
cases involving ART, this solution would solve many of the current prob-
lems. A genetic tie would be but one piece of evidence in determining citi-
zenship at birth.
In addition to reforming ius sanguinis statutes, however, I believe we 
must also broaden the other available pathways to citizenship outside of 
birthright citizenship and traditional forms of naturalisation. There could 
be a deadline – perhaps by a specified birthday – by when a functional par-
ent could request a declaration of citizenship for the child he or she has 
parented since birth. This alternative means of citizenship transmission 
should not substitute for birthright citizenship; as Kristin Collins points 
out, making citizenship determinations using only functional tests would 
put children at the mercy of officials seeking to deny citizenship and could 
disadvantage genetic or intentional fathers who may be unable to demon-
strate that their care has been substantial enough to be ‘functional.’ But 
combined with a robust recognition of genetic and intentional parentage at 
birth, recognition of functional parentage later on could serve a supplemen-
tal purpose, ensuring that children will ultimately have access to citizen-
ship rights in the country in which their functional parents reside. Full 
recognition of parent- child relationships requires going beyond the moment 
of birth so that we can recognise the individuals who actually take on 
parental responsibility.
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It is premature to forsake the recognition of parent-child relationships in 
citizenship law, not when citizenship is still the mechanism for ensuring that 
every human being has membership in at least one state and providing 
access to basic human rights. But it is time that we abandoned the idea that 
‘blood’ is the sole basis of these relationships.
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